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Kingspan fine and KKR Statement of Objections reveal Commission’s firm stance on accuracy of submissions in merger investigations

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On 8 October 2026, the European Commission fined Irish building materials firm Kingspan €40m for providing incorrect and misleading information during a merger investigation, both in its merger notification and in responses to Commission information requests. This was followed shortly afterwards by the issuing of formal charges to KKR for similar conduct.

These developments suggest the Commission is once again looking to send a clear message that it is willing to “act firmly” following any “compromise on disclosure and transparency” in its merger investigations, after a period of over five years without finding any such infringements.

Kingspan/Trimo 

Background

In August 2020, Kingspan agreed to acquire Trimo, a rival manufacturer of insulating panels headquartered in Slovenia. The transaction was notified to the European Commission in March 2021 and referred for an in-depth investigation the following month, in light of concerns that the combined business “would be by far the largest player in Europe and the main supplier of high-quality mineral fibre sandwich panels”. 

This in-depth investigation led to the Commission issuing a Statement of Objections (SO) in March 2022, setting out its preliminary view that the transaction would lead to higher prices, reduced quality and/or less choice for customers. The parties subsequently abandoned the deal in April 2022, but this did not prevent the Commission from opening a further investigation in November 2022 – this time into whether Kingspan had supplied incorrect or misleading information during the original merger review.

Findings of infringement 

On 19 March 2024, the Commission sent Kingspan an SO setting out its preliminary view that the company had committed six separate infringements of Article 14(1) of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) by providing incorrect and/or misleading information. 

Following the submission of Kingspan’s response to the SO, the Commission dropped two of the charges. However, it went on to conclude that Kingspan had committed four distinct infringements of the EUMR by - at least negligently - providing: 

  • misleading information about how it monitored penetration rates; 
  • incorrect or misleading information about whether bidding data were available; 
  • incorrect information about the involvement of its board members in: (i) the proposed acquisition of Trimo, (ii) other acquisitions under consideration, and (iii) industry trends and business strategy; and
  • incorrect or misleading information about its research and development (R&D) activities. 

A public version of the infringement decision is not yet available. However, the Commission’s press release notes that: 

  • the incorrect or misleading information was submitted in the original merger notification as well as in replies to Commission requests for information (RFIs) – both simple (i.e. non-compulsory) under EUMR Article 11(2) and by decision (i.e. mandatory) under Article 11(3);
  • Kingspan asserted that certain key documents did not exist, misrepresented key facts, and claimed that it was impossible to provide key information that only it was in a position to provide; and
  • these failures obstructed the investigation and made it difficult for the Commission to review the transaction properly.

Determining the penalty

Pursuant to Article 14(1) EUMR, the Commission can impose fines of up to 1% of a company’s global turnover for intentionally or negligently supplying incorrect, incomplete or misleading information during a merger review. In this case, the Commission decided to impose a €10m fine for each of the four infringements, for a total of €40m. In doing so, it pointed to the seriousness of the infringements and the fact that Kingspan must have been aware of its transparency obligations under the EUMR (Kingspan has notified six mergers to the Commission in the past 11 years). 

The fine imposed in this case is high in headline terms. It is also very significant compared to the value of the target (Trimo was ultimately sold to Recticel for €164m). Further, the fine equated to 0.43% of Kingspan’s global revenue in 2025. Although materially below the maximum 1% the Commission could have imposed, this is considerable when compared to previous fines (on which see the section on the Commission’s track record below).

However, this is likely not the end of the matter, as Kingspan has announced it intends to appeal the infringement decision and fine “in full”.

KKR/NetCo

Merger investigation and clearance

The Commission cleared KKR’s acquisition of NetCo unconditionally at Phase 1 on 30 May 2024. During the investigation, concerns were raised by third-party operators that the transaction might result in their access to wholesale broadband infrastructure being restricted, as it gave KKR sole control of both the primary and secondary networks previously operated by Telecom Italia (the secondary networks had previously been controlled jointly by Telecom Italia and KKR, through their FiberCop joint venture). Those input foreclosure concerns were ruled out in light of statements by KKR that the terms of NetCo’s existing long-term wholesale access agreements would continue to apply, and could not be changed without the agreement of the relevant wholesale customers.

Statement of Objections for incomplete/misleading information

The transaction having closed in July 2024, the Commission subsequently opened a formal investigation under Article 14(1) in July 2025, prompted by complaints from third-party operators that KKR (acting through FiberCop) had, post-transaction, unilaterally increased its wholesale access prices. On 19 October 2026, the Commission revealed that it had sent KKR an SO setting out its preliminary view that KKR had provided incorrect or misleading information about its long-term wholesale broadband access agreements. KKR will now have the opportunity to review the Commission’s file, reply to the charges, and request an oral hearing. Based on previous cases, it could take two years or more for a final decision to be reached (or significantly less if KKR settles). If an infringement is established, it will be particularly interesting to see whether the Commission merely imposes a fine under Article 14(1) EUMR, as in the other cases to date, or goes further and revokes its clearance decision under Article 6(3). 

The Commission’s track record of Article 14(1) EUMR enforcement

Despite having issued a number of fines for similar infringements under the EUMR’s predecessor1, the Commission went 13 years before first imposing a fine under EUMR Article 14(1). There then followed a four-year period of regular deployment of this power, with the Commission imposing fines in three separate instances. 

  • A €110m fine on Facebook in 2017. Facebook was fined for two distinct infringements during the investigation of its acquisition of WhatsApp. It was found to have provided incorrect and misleading information in its merger notification and in a reply to an RFI. In both, it said it could not reliably match Facebook and WhatsApp user accounts automatically, when that was already technically possible in 2014. The €110m fine equated to 0.44% of Facebook’s global revenue in 2016 - one of the largest procedural fines ever imposed by the Commission (and as a percentage of overall revenue, broadly the same as the fine imposed on Kingspan).
  • A €52m fine imposed on General Electric in 2019. General Electric was fined for one infringement during the investigation of its planned acquisition of LM Wind. It was found to have provided incorrect information by saying it had no higher-power offshore wind turbine in development beyond its existing 6 MW model, when in fact it was already discussing a potential 12 MW offshore turbine with customers. The €52m fine equated to 0.05% of General Electric’s global revenue in 2018.
  • A €7.5m fine imposed on Sigma-Aldrich in 2021. Sigma-Aldrich was fined for three distinct infringements during the investigation of its acquisition by Merck. It was found to have provided incorrect or misleading information about its iCap innovation project when detailing its proposed remedy package and in a reply to an RFI. The €7.5m fine equated to 0.36% of Sigma-Aldrich’s global revenue in 20142.

However, an SO under Article 14(1) does not always lead to a fine. In Munksjö/Ahlstrom - involving a merger between two speciality paper businesses – internal documents the parties produced in Phase 2 put the size of the abrasive paper backings markets “significantly lower”, and the parties’ market share “significantly higher”, than estimates included in the original merger notification. The Commission issued an SO in 2014, alleging that the parties had breached their obligation to give their “true best estimates of the markets in question”. However, it later closed the proceedings without a fine, after considering the parties’ replies to the SO, the oral hearing and, in particular, their answer to an RFI. Similarly, in the Sigma-Aldrich case the Commission issued an SO against its acquirer, Merck. The Commission agreed to revoke the charges as Merck successfully argued that the relevant documents and information held by Sigma-Aldrich were outside of its control at the time they were submitted.

Why are these cases arising?

The Kingspan fine and the KKR SO hint at a reversion towards a firmer stance on enforcement of Article 14(1), after a five-year period of relative quiet. 

It is unclear what is driving this trend, particularly as no public decision or charges are available in either the Kingspan or KKR cases. However, it is self-evident that the larger and more complex the transaction and the parties to it, the greater the room for error. Parties must collect information and documents from many custodians and advisers, answer extensive requests on tight deadlines, and co-ordinate parallel filings in multiple jurisdictions. Furthermore, investigations are becoming increasingly forward-looking – focusing on dynamic and innovation competition. This requires the Commission to rely heavily on statements from merger parties about their product pipelines, product features, and the status of R&D projects, which could be contradicted by later market developments. 

An examination of the published decisions also suggests that Commission enforcement of Article 14(1) has focused on merger parties responding to information requests and merger notification questions in a selective and/or self-serving manner, rather than failures to find information when under the pressure of an investigation timetable. For example, Facebook said it could not reliably match user accounts because it narrowly (and wrongly) read a Commission RFI as concerning only the matching of accounts for app interoperability purposes. General Electric appeared to deliberately downplay the status of a turbine development project following an unfavourable customer response. And Sigma-Aldrich was selective when identifying in-scope R&D projects in order to avoid having to include a particular one in the remedy package. Whilst not all the infringements were formally found to be intentional, in each case the parties were not entirely transparent with the Commission. By contrast, Munksjö/Ahlstrom – concerning market size estimates, which are not always precise and can be wrong without any deliberate attempt to mislead – ended without a fine.

Furthermore, as the Commission pushes to streamline reviews – with only around 1-2% of cases going to Phase 2 in recent years – it is increasingly reliant on the parties’ own statements. Robust enforcement in relation to statements made during the Phase 1 process acts as a deterrent and a necessary safeguard for that reliance. In this regard it is notable that all the Article 14(1) fines to date related to Phase 1 clearances.

Key takeaways 

Beyond the obvious need for accuracy and completeness, the cases above suggest a number of practical lessons for merging parties and their advisers.

  • Verify before asserting. Avoid unverified categorical statements, which appear to have lain at the heart of a number of previous infringement decisions, as well as the ongoing KKR case. Advocacy should be reconciled with internal documents, with any differences explained in the notification itself. 
  • Take particular care when addressing innovation and future conduct. Much of the information at issue in previous infringements concerned pipeline products and R&D, where the Commission relies heavily on the parties for relevant information. Further, statements about future conduct may well be tested against actual behaviour (as in KKR), particularly if customers are likely to take issue with it.
  • Assume the truth will out – even if after the investigation is over. Third parties often bring inaccuracies to light: in General Electric, a customer informed the Commission about the proposed high-power turbine during market testing; in KKR, complaints about price increases prompted the investigation; and in Sigma-Aldrich, the purchaser of the divestment assets complained to the monitoring trustee after discovering that the iCap project had been deliberately carved out of the package. It should also be noted that abandoning a deal does not end the exposure, as Kingspan’s fine shows.
  • Experience raises the bar. Frequent acquirers can expect to be held to a higher standard, and to find it harder to argue that any inaccuracy was an innocent mistake.

Finally, parties notifying deals in the UK should note that the CMA now has comparable powers to the Commission to penalise inaccurate submissions. Since the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 came into force at the beginning of 2025, the CMA has been able to fine firms up to 1% of annual and/or 5% of daily turnover for supplying false or misleading information without reasonable excuse3. Previously it could only issue fixed/daily fines capped at £30,000 and £15,000 respectively for breaches of mandatory information requests under s109 of the Enterprise Act 2002. The CMA imposed such penalties in several cases, but it is yet to deploy its enhanced fining powers (N.B. in at least one recent case the CMA required the parties to withdraw a merger notice containing a material inaccuracy and refile it).

 

Footnotes

1. Regulation 4064/89, under which fines were capped at only €50,000 per infringement.

2. A 2020 figure is not publicly available, since Sigma-Aldrich no longer publishes standalone revenue data.

3. The submission of false or misleading information knowingly or recklessly was previously (and still is) capable of being prosecuted as a criminal offence, but this requires a court process and has never been pursued by the CMA.

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