The Competition Appeal Tribunal has made its first damages award under the UK’s collective proceedings regime, in favour of a class of around 36 million Apple device users. In a 396-page judgment published on 23 October 2025, the Tribunal upheld the claim of class representative Dr Rachael Kent that Apple abused dominant positions in various iOS app-related services, through both foreclosure of competition from rival providers by virtue of exclusive dealing and tying practices, and excessive and unfair pricing.

The judgment represents a notable victory for claimants, after the first two collective proceedings to reach trial in Le Patourel v BT and Gutmann v First MTR were each dismissed. More broadly, it addresses several significant principles of competition law and litigation.

In this article, we set out the background and the key findings in the judgment. We intend to publish further analysis in due course.

Background

Dr Kent’s claim alleged that between 1 October 2015 and 15 November 2024, Apple charged abusive prices to app developers, which in turn resulted in developers charging higher prices to Apple device users who made app-related payments. The particular price at issue was Apple’s charge to developers of commission (the Commission), at a headline rate of 30%, on the price paid by users when downloading an app or making an iOS in-app payment. Dr Kent alleged class-wide damages of c. £1.2bn to £2.2bn (or £27 to £75 on average per user).

Two contextual points are worth emphasis, as they proved significant at several stages of the analysis.

• The Commission takes place within Apple’s overall digital ‘ecosystem’, which integrates (1) the device (i.e. the iPhone or iPad); (2) the iOS operating system; (3) the iOS apps installed on the device; and (4) the services provided to iOS users, including the App Store. Apple contended that it was vital to factor this overall ecosystem, and the benefits that it offered to Apple device users, into consideration of the issues of market definition, dominance and abuse. These arguments largely failed to influence the Tribunal’s conclusions.

• Dr Kent’s claim was brought on a stand-alone basis, i.e. without reliance on a regulatory decision to establish liability. However, the Commission has been the subject of various other claims and regulatory actions or investigations around the world. The degree to which the Tribunal should rely on these was hotly contested. Although the Tribunal determined that it should “in the first instance focus on the evidence before [it] in this case”, it accorded a “high degree of respect” in particular to the CMA’s 2022 mobile ecosystems market study (the MEM Study) (notwithstanding Apple’s contention that this was not an infringement decision in the context of which Apple could have exercised procedural rights) and the European Commission’s 2024 Decision in Case AT.40437 (the Spotify Decision) (notwithstanding that this is on appeal). It used these “as a reference point for consistency, or to fill gaps which there might otherwise be in the evidence before [it]”.

Findings

The Tribunal’s key findings on the relevant issues were as follows.

A. Market definitions

The Tribunal determined there to be two relevant markets: for iOS app distribution services (iOS AD Services), and for iOS in-app payment services (iOS IAP Services), and reached this conclusion on the following basis.

• The Tribunal employed the conventional ‘hypothetical monopolist’ test, by considering whether there was sufficient substitutability with other products by reference to the small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test. The Tribunal relied on evidence from the PC games market to determine a hypothetical ‘competitive price’, choosing as suitable comparators the Epic Games Store and the Microsoft Store (each of which charge a 12% commission) and Steam (which charges c. 20% commission to its largest developers). The gap between these levels and the 30% Commission level led the Tribunal to conclude that there were no substitution options available that would justify any wider product market.

• In doing so, the Tribunal rejected Apple’s contention that the primary (devices) and secondary (iOS AD Services) markets should be considered as one overall systems market for this purpose, principally on the basis that customers are generally unlikely to make decisions about device purchasing based on app prices.

• The Tribunal similarly rejected Apple’s proposal to treat Google or Android app stores as comparators, on the basis that the MEM Study indicates they “may not be reliable benchmarks for a competitive market”.

B. Dominance

A consequence of the Tribunal’s market definitions was that Apple had a 100% market share in those markets. As a result, and having found “contractual restrictions which create very high barriers to entry” and rejected Apple’s contention that these markets should be considered as part of a wider systems market, the Tribunal had little hesitation in concluding that Apple was dominant in these markets.

The Tribunal did nonetheless accept Apple’s invitation to consider the broader competitive constraints which Apple actually faces, but concluded that competition between device manufacturers leading to user switching was very unlikely to be a material constraint on Apple’s ability to set the Commission at the level it wished. In any event, the Tribunal found that there were several practical disincentives for users to switch from iOS to Android devices.

C. Foreclosure – exclusive dealing and tying

Dr Kent successfully alleged that Apple had unlawfully foreclosed competition in the relevant markets by: (1) requiring that iOS apps can only be distributed through the App Store and that iOS in-app purchases must use Apple’s payment systems; and (2) tying Apple’s provision of IAP Services (the tied product) to the App Store (the tying product).

Apple’s threshold defence to both these allegations, relying on the Magill line of authorities, was that the potential competition that would exist in the proposed counterfactual world would breach Apple’s IP rights, and it would not be anti-competitive for Apple (even if dominant) to impose limits on the use of its IP. In this context, Apple submitted that competition law only requires the compulsory licensing of IP rights in exceptional circumstances. However, the Tribunal concluded that there was no requirement to establish such exceptional circumstances where, as here, the relevant restrictions were to prevent developers from using a third party’s payment infrastructure, rather than to reserve Apple’s IP rights to itself.

As regards exclusive dealing, the Tribunal rejected Apple’s contentions that: (1) the restrictions were the means by which Apple differentiates itself for competitive purposes and competes at an ecosystem level (including at the level of devices and the App Store); and (2) a counterfactual analysis would demonstrate no appreciable increase in competition in the absence of the restrictions. Taking these in turn:

• The Tribunal determined that “as a matter of principle… Apple cannot rely on competition in a different market (the devices market) to excuse exclusionary conduct in separate markets (rather, the proper place for such an argument is at the objective justifications stage), and noted that it “found it difficult to see how such extreme exclusionary conduct can sensibly be justified as competition on the merits”.

• The Tribunal considered that Apple’s expert’s own acceptance that in the counterfactual: (1) Apple’s market share for iOS AD Services might realistically reduce to 90%; and (2) there would be “an appreciable degree of interest in market entry” in iOS IAP Services, demonstrated that the restrictions were capable of appreciably affecting competition.

As regards tying, and with reference to the four conditions that the parties agreed fell to be considered, the Tribunal had already determined that the tying and tied products were separate products (Condition 1), Apple was dominant in the market for the tying product (Condition 2) and the tying foreclosed competition (Condition 4). As regards Condition 3 (coercion), the Tribunal determined that Apple did not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product, considering it irrelevant that developers could in theory avail themselves of other ways to monetise apps (such as through in-app advertising).

D. Excessive and unfair pricing

The Tribunal again ruled in Dr Kent’s favour, applying the standard two-limb test under United Brands to assess whether: (1) the difference between the costs actually incurred and the Commission charged was excessive; and, if so, (2) whether the Commission was unfair, either (a) in itself or (b) by reference to comparators.

• As regards Limb 1, the Tribunal accepted Dr Kent’s expert’s Cost Plus analysis as providing reasonably reliable estimates which demonstrated that there was a significant and persistent difference between price and cost. That analysis calculated three profitability ratios for the App Store: return on revenue (c. 75%), return on assets (c. 110%) and return on capital employed (c. 375%).

• As regards Limb 2, rather than seeking to identify what a “fair” Commission would be, the Tribunal attempted to give weight to all the items of evidence (including the Limb 1 finding of excessiveness, consistent with the Tribunal’s approach in Le Patourel) according to their reliability and relative significance. On “unfair in itself”, the Tribunal found it significant that the Limb 1 exercise demonstrated “a very significant level of profitability on all measures”. On “unfair by reference to comparators”, the Tribunal again found the 12% commissions charged by Epic Games Store and Microsoft Store, and the 20% commission charged by Steam to its largest developers, to be the most useful comparators.

While for both limbs the Tribunal accepted the need to consider other evidence that might indicate “intangible” economic value, it did not consider that this evidence changed the conclusion, including since Apple had not sought to quantify the value of such intangible aspects.

E. Justification

Apple unsuccessfully sought to justify the restrictions based on (1) efficiency and (2) objective necessity. In both cases, Apple contended that offering an “integrated and centralised device ecosystem” is a legitimate objective that benefits users (including as regards security, privacy and safety) and creates an efficient system for the collection of the Commission. Taking the two justifications in turn:

• The Tribunal was quickly able to reject the efficiency justification on the basis that Condition 4 under the Post Danmark I test was not met: the conduct did eliminate effective competition. The Tribunal noted that it would not, in any event, have been satisfied that the value of the efficiencies asserted by Apple outweighed the harm to users, since those efficiencies were either insufficiently material or insufficiently attributable to the relevant restrictions.

• As regards objective necessity, the Tribunal considered that the restrictions could not sensibly be justified as necessary or proportionate to deliver the benefits that Apple relied on.

F. Overcharge

The Tribunal considered it appropriate to calculate a common overcharge for both the foreclosure and the excessive and unfair pricing abuses, on the basis that “a robust counterfactual for competition on the merits… ought to produce more or less the same result”.

The Tribunal rejected (for lack of evidence) Apple’s contention that, in the counterfactual, it would nonetheless have recovered the Commission actually generated because it would instead have chosen to impose a common cost for its tools and technology on all developers (i.e. not just those who charge for apps or in-app content). Instead, the Tribunal largely based its analysis of the counterfactual Commission on comparators. Taking the two relevant markets in turn, the Tribunal therefore concluded that the counterfactual Commission would have been:

• 17.5% (implying a 12.5% overcharge) as regards iOS AD Services, again relying on the Epic Games Store, Microsoft Store and Steam commission levels; and

• 10% (implying a 20% overcharge) as regards iOS IAP Services, based on the headline commission rate set by Paddle (a third party payment services firm founded by Dr Kent’s one factual witness).

G. ‘Incidence’ (i.e. pass-on from developers to consumers)

Applying the broad axe, the Tribunal found an overall pass-on rate of the overcharge from developers to Apple device users of 50%. The Tribunal made the following observations in reaching this conclusion.

• The overcharge is of a sufficiently high level that it is likely to have led to a material increase in costs for most developers.

• The reference in the Spotify Decision to Apple having “concede[d] that music streaming service providers “pass on” Apple’s commission” is admissible evidence of a relationship between increased Commission rates to developers and increased developer prices to customers.

• As a matter of economic theory, the degree of pass-on is likely to have varied significantly as between developers depending on the extent to which they have marginal costs. For developers with material marginal costs, it could have been around 90%. For developers with no marginal costs, it could have been negligible.

• In light of the paucity of detailed evidence about the shape of the distribution curve between zero and 90%, and the unreliability of the parties’ experts’ econometric analysis, the Tribunal considered 50% an appropriate rate, applying “informed guesswork”.

H. Interest

The Tribunal found a simple interest rate of 8%, based on Bank of England data on rates for unsecured loans of £3,000-£5,000. In doing so, the Tribunal accepted Dr Kent’s submission that the relatively small level of individual loss was no reason to displace the general presumption that private individuals (as well as commercial entities) will borrow to finance such losses.

Looking ahead

The Tribunal has listed a hearing on 13 November 2025 to consider all consequential matters, including costs, any applications for permission to appeal and the process for resolving any questions regarding the calculation of quantum. Thereafter, it will be interesting to see the process that is established for the distribution of damages, in particular the degree to which engagement from individual class members is required.

In considering any potential appeal of this judgment, Apple will also have in mind its strategic response to the CMA’s recent confirmation of its proposed decision under the DMCCA to designate Apple (as well as Google) as having strategic market status in mobile platforms, including app distribution.

Finally, it will be interesting to see the effect of this judgment on parallel collective proceedings against Apple in respect of the Commission on behalf of app developers (as opposed to Apple device users), and against Google (at both the developer and end consumer level), which similarly concern Google’s provision of distribution services to Android app developers and the charging of commission on app purchases or in-app purchases. A CMC is currently listed in the Google proceedings for 18 December 2025.