In what is thought to be an English legal first, the court has granted an injunction preventing enforcement of a $15m English judgment granted in 2018. The decision in Federal Republic of Nigeria and another v Williams [2025] EWHC 2217 (Comm) shows the breadth of the English courts’ powers to deal with allegations of fraud.

Background

In 2018, Dr Williams obtained default judgment in England against the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its Attorney General in a claim in which he alleged he had lost money pursuant to fraudulent breach of trust for which the Republic was ultimately responsible.

In 2023, Dr Williams began proceedings in New York seeking to have the default judgment recognised and enforced there. The Republic resists that enforcement claim on grounds that the underlying claim presented by Dr Williams was fundamentally dishonest and founded on fabricated documents.

In 2024, the Republic brought a claim in England to have the default judgment set aside, on essentially the same grounds that it was obtained fraudulently.

In June 2025, the Republic applied for an anti-enforcement injunction to prevent enforcement of the default judgment pending determination of its set-aside claim. The New York court then made an order that the enforcement proceedings before it be stayed pending the English High Court’s decision whether to grant the injunction.

Decision

The Republic sought the anti-enforcement injunction on the grounds that enforcement of the default judgment before determination of the set-aside claim would be vexatious and oppressive. 

The court briefly explored the question of which test applies where the “vexatious and oppressive” ground is relied on. The possibilities were either that the applicant must show a serious issue to be tried, or that it must show a high probability that it will succeed at trial. The latter is particularly appropriate where, rather than simply ‘holding the ring’, granting an injunction would be likely to in effect decide the issue.

The court had little hesitation in granting the anti-enforcement injunction. This was not a case where granting the injunction would effectively determine the issue. But even if it were, the Republic’s case appeared strong and so whichever test applied, the judge felt that it would be satisfied. On the evidence at present, the Republic did have a high probability of succeeding in its case and it would indeed be vexatious and oppressive to allow enforcement of the default judgment before the set-aside claim is decided.

The court also observed that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction, as there would be ‘irreparable prejudice’ to the Republic if Dr Williams were permitted to enforce the default judgment and it later turned out to have been obtained fraudulently. In that case, the Republic might have irrecoverably lost any sums paid out. Whereas there would be only limited prejudice to Dr Williams, as if the default judgment were eventually to be upheld, he would only have suffered some delay, and this could be compensated in damages for the interest accrued.

Comment

The court said it was not presented with any case law to show that an English anti-enforcement injunction had ever been granted in respect of an English judgment before. But there was no reason in principle why one should not be available. It therefore appears now to be confirmed that such injunctions should be available if evidence comes to light that an English judgment has been procured by fraud on the court.

While anti-enforcement injunctions are comparatively rare, that is generally because they are usually sought in respect of judgments given overseas, and comity demands respect for the decisions of foreign courts. In this instance, those considerations were not relevant because it was the English court’s own judgment that was under consideration.

It is reassuring to see the English courts again dealing robustly with allegations of fraud. It was readily apparent to the judge that where there is good evidence a judgment has been obtained by fraud, that judgment should not be enforceable until the situation has been carefully re-examined.

The case also demonstrates effective co-operation between the English and New York courts in dealing with allegations of fraud, with the New York court respectfully deciding it should not proceed with an enforcement case about an English judgment while knowing that the English court itself was about to determine the injunction application.